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1. Introduction 
 
In the presence of labor market discrimination, wage differentials are a function of 
population composition. With employer discrimination Becker (1971a) showed that as 
the supply of the discriminated group increases, its wage falls and the wage of the 
non-discriminated group increases, resulting in a larger relative wage differential. 
Becker’s analysis relied on perfectly inelastic labor supplies and constant 
discrimination preferences. In the long run labor supplies may not be fixed and 
discrimination preferences may change in response to a changing population 
composition. How does changing population composition affect wages of 
discriminated and non-discriminated groups when labor supplies and preferences 
vary? This question bears directly on any analysis of the effects of the changing racial 
and ethnic composition in the US in the past 30 years which saw the proportion of 
non-Hispanic white population falling from 80 percent in 1980 to 64 percent in 2010 
(US Census Bureau, 1995, 2011). This paper shows that a changing population 
composition has three distinct effects on wages and derives the conditions 
determining the direction of each effect.   
 Initially Becker’s taste-based discrimination models were viewed as plausible 
only in the short run. Subsequent theoretical work by Goldberg (1982) and Charles 
and Guryan (2007) showed how employer discrimination may endure in the long run 
and Charles and Guryan (2008) found empirical support for Becker’s model for the 
period 1972-2004.  
 In this paper we follow Goldberg’s (1982) articulation of Becker’s (1971a) 
employer discrimination model and allow for labor supply to vary at the extensive 
margin and preferences to change with population composition. The focus on the 
extensive margin is empirically relevant and theoretically convenient. Unlike its effect 
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on hours, the effect of wages on participation can be assumed monotonic. Moreover it 
is widely accepted that the labor supply responsiveness at the extensive margin 
dominates that of the intensive margin (Heckman 1993).  
 
2. The model  
Consider two types of workers, M and F, with identical productive capacity.  
Employers dislike employing workers of type F, with this distaste expressed in a 
discrimination coefficient dF. When the market wage for the F workers is wF, 
employers value it as (1 )F Fd w  with 0Fd  . Following Becker (1971b), employers’ 
preferences are expressed as: 
 
F F FU d w L          (1) 
 
where   denotes profits and LF the employment of F workers. An employer’s 
problem is to maximize utility subject to:  
 
( ) ( )M FQ f L f L L         (2) 
( )F F M MQ w L w L          (3) 
 
where the price of output is taken as the numeraire and 0f   , 0f   . From the first 
order conditions we have: 
 
Mf w    if 0ML  , and  
Mf w    if 0ML       (4) 
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(1 )F Ff w d    if 0FL  , and  
(1 )F Ff w d    if 0FL       (5) 
 
Conditions (4) and (5) imply that in a competitive labor market with a continuous 
distribution of dF across employers and for given wages for M and F, a firm hires 
either only M or only F workers. If an employer’s dF is such that (1 )M F Fw w d  , 
the relative market wage differential between M and F is higher than this employer’s 
discrimination coefficient, and therefore only F are employed. For such a firm the 
marginal cost of hiring F workers is always below the marginal cost of hiring M 
workers. Similarly, if an employer’s dF is such that (1 )M F Fw w d  , only M workers 
are hired. 
 If dF has a density ( ; )F Mh d p , then 
1
1F
x
d


 has a density ( ; )Mg x p  which, 
in principle, can be derived from ( ; )F Mh d p  (see Goldberg (1982)). The distribution 
of discrimination coefficients depends on the parameter Mp , the proportion of the 
non-discriminated group. We have no strong priors on how population composition 
affects discriminatory preferences. In the sociology and psychology literature the 
inter-group threat theory suggests that discrimination increases as the proportion of 
the discriminated group increases while the inter-group contact theory points to 
conditions that generate the opposite effect (Dixon, 2006, Pettigrew 1998). In terms of 
1
1F
x
d


, inter-group threat theory implies that the distribution of x for higher Mp  
first-order stochastically dominates that for lower Mp . Inter-group contact theory 
implies the reverse.    
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Individuals either work for a fixed number of hours or not at all. If the 
cumulative distribution function of reservation wages of group k is given by ( )k kS w , 
k = F, M, then ( )k kS w  is the employment rate of group k at wage wk. The equilibrium 
wages of groups F, M are determined by:  
 
/
0
( ) ( ) ( ; )
F Mw w
M M M M Mp S w R w g x p dx      (6) 
 
1
/
( ) ( ) ( ; )
F M
F
F F F M
w w
wp S w R g x p dx
x
       (7) 
 
where pk is the population proportion of group k = F, M, 1( ) [ ] ( )R f     is a firm’s 
labor demand, and population size is normalised to one.     
 Equations (6) and (7) indicate that the F/M wage ratio regulates the clearing of 
the markets for each group. In equilibrium the aggregate supply of M workers equals 
the sum of the demands of those firms with F
M
wx
w
 . The aggregate supply of the F 
workers equals the sum of the demands of those firms with F
M
wx
w
 . The general 
economic problem is the simultaneous clearing of the markets for two inputs which 
are imperfect substitutes, with the degree of substitutability variable and endogenous 
at the firm level.  
Goldberg (1982) discusses how firm size varies with (constant) discrimination 
preferences, and Becker (1971a) analyzes how shifts of the perfectly inelastic supplies 
of the two groups affect equilibrium wages.    
 
3. Analysis 
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To analyze the effects of a changing population composition on equilibrium wages, 
we derive M
M
dw
dp
 and F
M
dw
dp
 from equilibrium equations (6) and (7). We obtain: 
 
1
3 1 3 1 1 3 22 2 2[ ( ) ( ) ( ) ]
F
M
F F F
M F F M M M M
M M M
dw
dp
w w wE S S S E p S E D E p S E D
w w w
  
       
 
 
         (8.1)  
 
1
3 3 3
2 2 1 2[ ( ) ( ) ( ) ]
M
M
M F M F F F F
M M M
dw
dp
E E ES S S E p S E p S D D
w w w
  
       
 
 
         (8.2) 
 
where  
/ /
1
0 0
[ ( ) ( ; ) ] ( ) ( ; ) 0
F M F Mw w w w
M M M M
M
E R w g x p dx R w g x p dx
w

   
    
1 1
2
/ /
1 1[ ( ) ( ; ) ] ( ) ( ; ) 0
F M F M
F F
M M
F w w w w
w wE R g x p dx R g x p dx
w x x x x

  
    
3 ( ) ( ; ) 0FM M
M
wE R w g p
w
   
/ /
1
0 0
( ) ( ; ) [ ( ) ( ; ) ]
F M F Mw w w w
M M M M M
M
D R w g x p dx R w g x p dx
p

 
   
 
1 1
2
/ /
( ) ( ; ) [ ( ) ( ; ) ]
F M F M
F F
M M M
Mw w w w
w wD R g x p dx R g x p dx
x p x

 
   
 
3
1 2 2 3 2( )( ) ( ) 0
F
M M F F F F
M M
E wE p S E p S E p S E
w w
            
1F Mp p   
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E1 (E2) is the rate of change in the demand for M (F) workers as their wage changes, 
keeping the equilibrium wage ratio — and therefore the density mass of M 
employers— fixed. These are negative as long as ( ) 0R   .   is signed using 
( ) 0R    and ( ) 0S    .  
D1 (D2) is the effect of the changing population composition on the labor 
demand of the M (F) workers, through its effect on the distribution of preferences, 
keeping the equilibrium wage ratio fixed. The signs of the D terms depend on the way 
the preference distribution changes as pM changes and are always opposite. If 
( ) 0F Md p   for all pM, then because ( ; )Mg x p  first-order stochastically dominates 
( ; )Mg x p  for Mp p  , we have 1 0D   and 2 0D  . If on the other hand ( ) 0F Md p   
for all pM, then the signs of 1D  and 2D  are reversed.  
 Equations (8.1) and (8.2) show that a changing population composition has 
three effects on wage levels. 
The aggregate market effect:  
The sign of the aggregate market effect depends on the difference in employment 
rates between the two groups, M FS S . For example, if M FS S  and Mp  increases, 
aggregate labor supply increases, putting downward pressure on the wages of both 
groups, and the aggregate market effect on both M
M
dw
dp
 and F
M
dw
dp
 is negative.  
The relative market effect: 
The sign of the relative market effect is always negative for the group whose 
population proportion increases and is the effect analyzed by Becker (1971a). 
The preference distribution effect: 
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This is the sum of the terms involving D1 and D2 and its direction cannot be 
determined a priori. D1 and D2 have opposite signs and which of the two is positive 
depends on whether ( ) 0F Md p   or ( ) 0F Md p  .  
 The direction of the overall effect on wage levels therefore depends on the 
signs and relative magnitudes of these three effects. If we have sufficient information 
to sign each of these effects, and if they all have the same direction, then we can 
predict the direction of the effect on wages. But it may be that some of these effects 
have opposite signs. For example, if F MS S  and pM increases, then aggregate and 
relative market effects work in the same direction for wF (increase) but in opposite 
directions for wM. Aggregate labor supply contracts, putting upward pressure on both 
wF and wM, while relative market effects put upward pressure on wF and downward 
pressure on wM.  
If M and F have the same reservation wage cdf, then F MS S  because we 
always have F Mw w . If the two groups have different cdfs for their reservation 
wages, then F MS S  is possible. For example, it is likely that the group that suffers 
discrimination has lower assets, which could imply that at any given wage the F 
employment rate is higher than the M employment rate. Then we will have F MS S  if 
the effect of lower assets is greater than the effect of lower wages.  
 Table 1 summarizes the direction of the effects on wage levels. The signs of 
the preference distribution effect reverse for ( ) 0F Md p  . The rows indicate the 
conditions necessary to sign the effects. If discrimination preferences are fixed, then 
the preference distribution effect is zero. In that case relative employment rates give 
sufficient information to sign the aggregate market effect, and if aggregate and 
relative market effects have the same sign, then the overall effect can also be signed. 
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If discrimination preferences vary with population composition, then signing the 
overall effect requires considerably more information.  
 
Table 1 
Effects of changing population composition on wage levels 
 F
M
dw
dp
 M
M
dw
dp
 
Relative market effect + –    
Aggregate market effect 
(Present only with variable labor supply) 
  
( ) ( )M M F FS w S w  + +  
( ) ( )M M F FS w S w  –  –    
( ) ( )M M F FS w S w  0  0  
Preference distribution effect, with ( ) 0F Md p   
(Present only when discrimination preferences 
vary with population composition ) 
  
1 1
2
3 2
1 /
/
M M
F M
E p S D
E w w D

    
 
+ / –   
 
2 2
3 1
1 /
/
F F
M
E p S D
E w D

    
 + / –  
 
 
We can measure the responsiveness of wages to changes in population 
composition using the population composition elasticity of wages, K HKH
H K
dw p
dp w
   , 
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for K, H = M, F. The sign of these elasticities is the same as the sign of K
H
dw
dp
. Their 
magnitude varies with the elasticities of labor supply, ( ) KK K K
K
wS w
S
  , K= M, F. 
Population composition elasticities are inversely related to own group elasticity of 
labor supply. For example, if K  increases, then | |KH  decreases, since the larger the 
labor supply adjustment to a change in population composition, the smaller the wage 
adjustment. This is not necessarily the case with cross group effects of labor supply 
elasticities, where the direction of the effects varies with the sign of both M
K
dw
dp
and 
F
K
dw
dp
. 
 The direction of the effects of changing population composition on the wage 
ratio is also uncertain. Substituting F
M
dw
dp
 and M
M
dw
dp
 into ( )F
M M
wd
dp w
 we obtain: 
1 2 2 1 1 2
1( )
[ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ]
F
M M M
F F
F M M M F F F F M M
M M
wd
dp w w
w wS E p S S E p S E p S D E p S D
w w
 

          
 
          (9) 
Here we have only a relative market and a preference distribution effect. The direction 
of the relative market effect is to increase the F/M wage ratio when pM increases while 
the direction of the preference distribution effect depends on whether ( ) 0F Md p   or 
( ) 0F Md p  . If increasing pM results in less discriminatory preferences, i.e. 
( ) 0F Md p  , then the relative market and distributional effects have the same 
direction. If however the conditions of the inter-group contact theory apply, then the 
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two effects work in opposite directions and we cannot determine a priori which 
dominates.  
If at the initial equilibrium we have 0Fd  , it is possible that changes in 
population composition result in an equilibrium with 0Fd  . This can occur with 
( ) 0F Md p   if the original equilibrium wage ratio is sufficiently close to 1F
M
w
w
  and 
pM  increases, or with ( ) 0F Md p   if pM  decreases.  
The research on wage differentials between white and black men in the US has 
found that productivity differentials account for a substantial part of their wage gap 
(Neal and Johnson, 1996, Bowlus and Eckstein, 2002). The results above can be 
generalized to allow for productivity differences between the two population groups. 
Aggregate and relative market effects are still present when the productivity of F 
workers is only a fraction  of that of the M workers, where 0 1  , and the 
production function takes the form ( )M FQ f L L  . However, the sign of the 
aggregate effect now depends on the relative magnitudes of ( )M MS w  and ( )F FS w  
instead of ( )F FS w . That is, with productivity differences it is the effective 
employment rates of the two groups that matter. In this formulation units of labor of 
the F workers are converted into units of labor of the M workers in order to compare 
the effective employment rates of the two groups.    
 
4. Conclusion  
In the context of employer discrimination with variable labor supplies and 
discrimination preferences varying with population composition, a changing 
population composition has three effects on wage levels: (i) a relative markets effect 
which is always negative for the group whose proportion increases in the population 
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and is always present when population composition varies, whether labor supply 
and/or discrimination preferences vary or not; (ii) an aggregate market effect, the 
direction of which depends on the relative employment rates of the two groups and is 
present only with variable labor supply; and (iii) a preference distribution effect the 
direction of which depends on the way distributional shifts affect the demands for the 
two groups, and is present only when preferences vary. These effects may work in 
opposite directions, in which case the direction of the overall effect depends on their 
relative magnitudes. If discrimination preferences are fixed then relative employment 
rates give sufficient information to sign the aggregate market effect, and if aggregate 
and relative market effects have the same sign, then the overall effect can be signed as 
well. If discrimination preferences vary with population composition, then signing the 
overall effect requires considerably more information. The direction of the effect on 
the wage ratio is more predictable. If discrimination increases as the proportion of the 
discriminated group increases, relative market and distributional effects work in the 
same direction to increase the relative wage differential. If discrimination decreases as 
the proportion of the discriminated group increases, then relative market and 
distributional effects work in opposite directions and the effect on wage ratio depends 
on their relative magnitudes. 
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Appendix 
I. Wage effects with variable preferences 
Result: The effects of a changing population composition on equilibrium wages are 
given by: 
1
3 1 3 1 1 3 22 2 2[ ( ) ( ) ( ) ]
F
M
F F F
M F F M M M M
M M M
dw
dp
w w wE S S S E p S E D E p S E D
w w w
  
       
 
 
1
3 3 3
2 2 1 2[ ( ) ( ) ( ) ]
M
M
M F M F F F F
M M M
dw
dp
E E ES S S E p S E p S D D
w w w
  
       
 
 
where  
/ /
1
0 0
[ ( ) ( ; ) ] ( ) ( ; ) 0
F M F Mw w w w
M M M M
M
E R w g x p dx R w g x p dx
w

   
    
1 1
2
/ /
1 1[ ( ) ( ; ) ] ( ) ( ; ) 0
F M F M
F F
M M
F w w w w
w wE R g x p dx R g x p dx
w x x x x

  
    
3 ( ) ( ; ) 0FM M
M
wE R w g p
w
   
/ /
1
0 0
( ) ( ; ) [ ( ) ( ; ) ]
F M F Mw w w w
M M M M M
M
D R w g x p dx R w g x p dx
p

 
   
 
1 1
2
/ /
( ) ( ; ) [ ( ) ( ; ) ]
F M F M
F F
M M M
Mw w w w
w wD R g x p dx R g x p dx
x p x

 
   
 
3
1 2 2 3 2( )( ) ( ) 0
F
M M F F F F
M M
E wE p S E p S E p S E
w w
            
1F Mp p   
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Derivation 
Differentiating (6) in the text wrt to pM, the LHS is unaffected by the dependence of 
discrimination preferences on pM: 
[ ( )] ( ) ( ) MM M M M M M M M
M M
dwd p S w S w p S w
dp dp
     (A I.1) 
The RHS gives: 
/ /
0 0
[ ( ) ( ; ) ] [ ( ) ( ; ) ]
F M F Mw w w w
M M M M
M M
d dR w g x p dx R w g x p dx
dp dp
  
/
0
/
2
0
( ) ( ; )
1( )[ ( ; )( ) ( ; ) ]
F M
F M
w w
M
M M
M
w w
F F F M
M M M M
M M M M M
dwR w g x p dx
dp
w dw w dwR w g p g x p dx
w w dp w dp
 
   


 (A I.2)   
The term due to the preferences being a function of the population composition here 
is: 
 
/
0
( ) ( ; )
F Mw w
M M MR w g x p dx  
The sign of this term depends on how the preference distribution changes as pM 
changes. If ( ) 0F Md p   for all pM, then because ( ; )Mg x p  first order stochastically 
dominates ( ; )Mg x p  for Mp p  , we have: 
/
0
( ; ) 0
F Mw w
M Mg x p dx  .  
This is because: 
 
/ /
0 0
( ; ) [ ( ; ) ]
F M F Mw w w w
M M M
M
dg x p dx g x p dx
dp
   
and by first-order stochastic dominance we have: 
/ /
0 0
( ; ) ( ; )
F M F Mw w w w
M Mg x p dx g x p dx    
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If ( ) 0F Md p   for all pM, then because ( ; )Mg x p  first order stochastically dominates 
( ; )Mg x p  for Mp p  , we have: 
/
0
( ; ) 0
F Mw w
M Mg x p dx   
If ( )F Md p  is not monotonic, then 
/
0
( ; )
F Mw w
M Mg x p dx  cannot be readily signed. 
Turning to (7) and differentiating wrt to pM, the LHS is again unaffected by 
the dependence of discrimination preferences on population composition: 
[(1 ) ( )] ( ) (1 ) ( ) FM F F F F M F F
M M
dwd p S w S w p S w
dp dp
        (A I.3) 
From the RHS we have: 
1
/
1
/
[ ( ) ( ; ) ]
( ) ( ) ( ; ) [ ( ) ( ; )]
/
F M
F M
F
M
M w w
F F F F
M M
M M F M M Mw w
wd R g x p dx
dp x
w w w wd R g p R g x p dx
dp w w w w p x


    



2
1 1
/ /
1( ) ( ; )( )
1( ) ( ; ) ( ) ( ; )
F M F M
F F F M
M M
M M M M M
F F F
M M M
Mw w w w
w dw w dwR w g p
w w dp w dp
w dw wR g x p dx R g x p dx
x x dp x
    
  
  (A I.4) 
The additional term due to preferences being a function of population composition is: 
1
/
( ) ( ; )
F M
F
M M
w w
wR g x p dx
x  
The sign of this term depends on how the preference distribution changes as pM 
changes. If ( ) 0F Md p   for all pM, then because ( ; )Mg x p  first-order stochastically 
dominates ( ; )Mg x p  for every Mp p  , we have: 
1
/
( ) ( ; ) 0
F M
F
M M
w w
wR g x p dx
x
  
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This is because if ( ; )Mg x p first-order stochastically dominates ( ; )Mg x p  for every 
Mp p  , this is equivalent to: 
( ) ( ; ) ( ) ( ; )M M M Ms x g x p dx s x g x p dx    
for every nondecreasing function s(x). Then let: 
0                   for 
( )
( )          for 
F
M
F F
M
wx
w
s x
w wR x
x w
 
 
 

 
Then  
1 1
/
( ) ( ; ) ( ) ( ; )
F M
F
M M
w w
ws x g x p dx R g x p dx
x
   
and by the first-order stochastic dominance 
1 1
/ /
( ) ( ; ) ( ) ( ; )
F M F M
F F
M M M M
w w w w
w wR g x p dx R g x p dx
x x
    
Similarly, if ( ) 0F Md p   for all pM, then because ( ; )Mg x p  first order stochastically 
dominates ( ; )Mg x p  for Mp p  , we have: 
1
/
( ) ( ; ) 0
F M
F
M M
w w
wR g x p dx
x
  
If ( )F Md p  is not monotonic 
1
/
( ) ( ; )
F M
F
M M
w w
wR g x p dx
x  cannot be readily signed. 
Now letting 
 
/
1
0
( ) ( ; )
F Mw w
M M MR w g x p dx D  
we solve (A I.1)-(A I.2) for M
M
dw
dp
 to obtain: 
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1
/
2
0
1( ) ( ) ( ; )
( ) ( ; ) ( ) ( ) ( ; )
F M
F F
M M M M
M M M M
w w
M F F
M M M M M M M
M M
w dwS w R w g p D
dw w w dp
dp w wR w g x p dx p S w R w g p
w w
 

  
     (A I.5) 
Letting:  
1
2
/
( ) ( ; )
F M
F
M M
w w
wR g x p dx D
x
  
we solve (A I.3)-(A I.4) for M
M
dw
dp
 to obtain: 
1
2
/
2
1 1( ) [(1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ; ) ( ) ( ; ) ]
( ) ( ; )
F M
M
M
F F F
F F M F F M M M
M M Mw w
F F
M M
M M
dw
dp
w w dwS w p S w R g x p dx R w g p D
x x w w dp
w wR w g p
w w

         
(A I.6) 
Using: 
/
1
0
( ) ( ; ) 0
F Mw w
M ME R w g x p dx    
1
2
/
1( ) ( ; ) 0
F M
F
M
w w
wE R g x p dx
x x
   
3 ( ) ( ; ) 0FM M
M
wE R w g p
w
   
and simplifying notation, from (A I.5) we have: 
3
1
1 3 2
F
M
M M M
FM
M M
M
E dwS D
dw w dp
wdp E p S E
w
 

 
       (A I.5’) 
From (A I.6) we have: 
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3
2 2
3 2
( ) FF F F
M M M
FM
M
E dwS p S E D
dw w dp
wdp E
w
     
      (A I.6’) 
Solving for F
M
dw
dp
 we find (8.1) and substituting in (A I.6’) we find (8.2). 
 
 
 II. Fixed preferences and productivity differences 
Suppose the two types of workers, M and F, have different productive characteristics. 
Without loss of generality assume that F is less productive than M. Suppose the 
production function takes the form: 
( )M FQ f L L    with 0 1    
This formulation implies that the marginal product of an F worker is a fraction   of 
the marginal product of an M worker. Without wage discrimination and competitive 
markets we would expect the F/M wage ratio to be  . With employer discrimination 
preferences, the first order conditions become:  
Mf w    if 0ML  , and  
Mf w    if 0ML        
(1 )(1 ) FF F F
df w d f w


       if 0FL  , and  
(1 )F
F
df w


      if 0FL       
For a given wage ratio, firms with dF such that (1 )M F Fw w d    hire only F workers 
and firms with dF such that (1 )M F Fw w d    hire only M workers. With x defined as 
1
1 F
x
d


 and with fixed discrimination preferences, the equilibrium wage ratio is 
determined by: 
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/
0
( ) ( ) ( )
F Mw w
M M M Mp S w R w g x dx

      (A II.1) 
1
/
( ) ( ) ( )
F M
F
F F F
w w
wp S w R g x dx
x


      (A II.2) 
Totally differentiating (A II.1) and solving for M
M
dw
dp
 we have: 
/
0
[ ( )] [ ( ) ( ) ]
F Mw w
M M M M
M M
d dp S w R w g x dx
dp dp

   
/
2
0
( ) ( )
1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
F M
M
M M M M M
M
w w
M F F F M
M M
M M M M M M
dwS w p S w
dp
dw w dw w dwR w g x dx R w g
dp w w dp w dp

  
  
      
 
/
2
0
1( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
F M
F F
M M M
M M M M
w w
M F F
M M M M M
M M
w dwS w R w g
dw w w dp
dp w wR w g x dx p S w R w g
w w

 
 
  
 
   
     (A II.3) 
Totally differentiating (A II.2) we have: 
1
/
1
2
/
[(1 ) ( )] [ ( ) ( ) ]
( ) (1 ) ( )
1 1[ ( ) ( ) ] ( ) ( )[ ]
F M
F M
F
M F F
M M w w
F
F F M F F
M
F F F F F M
M
M M M M M Mw w
wd dp S w R g x dx
dp dp x
dwS w p S w
dp
w dw w dw w dwR g x dx R w g
x x dp w w dp w dp




 
    
  
    
     


 
1
/
2
1 1( ) [(1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ]
( ) ( )
F M
M
M
F F F
F F M F F M
M M Mw w
F F
M
M M
dw
dp
dw w wS w p S w R g x dx R w g
dp x x w w
w wR w g
w w

 
   
 
 
     


          (A II.4) 
Solving for F
M
dw
dp
 we obtain: 
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1
3 12[ [ ( ) ( )] ( )[ ( )]]
F F
M M F F F F M M M
M M
dw wE S w S w S w E p S w
dp w
 

                (A II.5) 
where: 
/ /
1
0 0
[ ( ) ( ) ] ( ) ( ) 0
F M F Mw w w w
M M
M
E R w g x dx R w g x dx
w
 


   
    
1 1
2
/ /
1 1[ ( ) ( ) ] ( ) ( ) 0
F M F M
F F
F w w w w
w wE R g x dx R g x dx
w x x x x     

  
    
3 ( ) ( ) 0FM
M
wE R w g
w 
   
3
1 2 2 3 2( )( ) ( ) 0
F
M M F F F F
M M
E wE p S E p S E p S E
w w
 
 
            
We have shown that with 1  , if M FS S  then 0F
M
dw
dp
  is possible. With 
0 1  , it is still possible to have 0F
M
dw
dp
  if M FS S  . The direction of the 
aggregate effect is now determined by the productivity adjusted employment rates. 
With productivity differences it is possible for an increase in pM to reduce wF even 
when M FS S , as long as M FS S . This is because with the increase in pM 
aggregate supply increases because the M are relatively more productive.  
Substituting for F
M
dw
dp
 in (A II.4) we obtain: 
1 3
2[ ( ) ( )]M M F M F F
M M
Edw S S S E p S
dp w

  
         (A II.6) 
We have shown that 0M
M
dw
dp
  is possible with 1  , if M FS S . With 0 1   it is 
still possible to have 0M
M
dw
dp
 if M FS S . The effect 0M
M
dw
dp
  requires that the 
aggregate labor supply effect of an increase in pM is positive, that is, that aggregate 
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labor supply shifts to the left. For this to happen with 0 1   it is no longer 
sufficient to have M FS S . This is because an increase in pM can still increase 
aggregate labor supply because the M are more productive. So the employment rate of 
the M must be sufficiently lower than the employment rate of F in order to generate 
the shift of the aggregate labor supply to the left.  
 
 
III. Population composition elasticities and labor supply elasticities 
To express equations (8.1) and (8.2) in terms of labor supply elasticities, define the 
wage elasticity of supply of group G: 
1( ) ( )
/
G G G G G G G
G G G G
G G G G G G G G G G
w L w L w L wS w P
S w P L P P w L w L

 
        
  
 
where PG is the population of group G, P is the total population, and LG is the 
headcount of employed workers of group G,  for G=F, M. 
This elasticity measures the percentage change in the employment rate of group G in 
response to a percentage change in the wages of group G. Substituting into (8.1) and 
(8.2) we obtain: 
3 12
3
1 2 2 3 2
( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )
F M
M F F M M
F M M
M F F FM
M M F F F F
M M F F M
w pE S S S E S
dw w w
Ep p p wdp S E E S S E E
w w w w w

  
  

    
      (A III.1) 
and 
3
2
3
1 2 2 3 2
( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )
F
M F M F F
M M F
M F F FM
M M F F F F
M M F F M
E pS S S S E
dw w w
Ep p p wdp S E E S S E E
w w w w w

  
  

    
 (A III.2) 
 
The population composition elasticity of F wages is given by: 
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3
12
3 31
2 2 2
( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )
F M
FM
M F
F M
M F M M
M F M
M F F F
M F F F F
M M M F F M M
dw p
dp w
E S pS S E S
w w w
E ES E p p wE S S E
w p w w w p w


  
  
  

     
  (A III.3) 
 
The population composition elasticity of M wages is given by: 
3
2
3 3
1 2 2
( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )
M M
MM
M M
F
M F M F F
M F
M F F F
M M F F F F
M M F F M M
dw p
dp w
E pS S S S E
w w
E Ew p p wS E E S S E
p w w w p w


  
  
  

    
  (A III.4) 
The population composition elasticities of wages in terms of Fp  ( 1F Mp p  ) are 
derived similarly. Each of the population composition elasticities depends on the 
elasticities of supply of both groups. Differentiating FM  wrt F  we obtain: 
3
12
23 31
2 2 2
31
2
( ) ( )
[( )( ) ( ) ]
            ( )
F M
M F M M
FM M F M
M F F FF
M F F F F
M M M F F M M
F M F
F M
F M M M M
E S pS S E S
w w w
E ES E p p wE S S E
w p w w w p w
Ep S E wS
w w p p w


   

  

 
      
   
 
(A III.5) 
Since 1 0E  , 3 0E  , and 0M  , FM
F




 has the opposite sign of F
M
dw
dp
 and its sign 
varies for the same reasons the sign of F
M
dw
dp
 varies, i.e. depending on the relative 
employment rates of the two groups and on the relative sizes of the aggregate market 
and relative market effects. For example, if M FS S  and pM increases, we have 
already seen that wF unambiguously increases, as both aggregate and relative market 
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effects work in the same direction. This implies that 0FM
F





, i.e. the greater the 
elasticity of the F supply, the smaller the increase in wF. This is because increases in 
wF induce larger labor supply responses (expansions in this case) and therefore wF 
does not need to increase as much to adjust to the change in population composition. 
If on the other hand M FS S  and pM increases, if the aggregate market effect is 
greater than the relative market effect, wF will decrease. This implies that 0FM
F





. 
In this case FM  is negative and therefore a positive sign for FM
F




 means that FM  
increases algebraically and hence the elasticity decreases. The reason here is the same 
as previously: larger labor supply responses from the F (contractions in this case) 
reduce the adjustment required from the wage. In sum, regardless of whether FM  is 
positive or negative, the greater F , the smaller the population composition elasticity 
of wF. 
Turning to the relationship between FM  and M  we have: 
3
3 23
23 31
2 2 2
[ ( ) ( )]/
( )
            [( )( ) ( ) ]
FM M M F
M F M F F
M M M F
M F F F
M F F F F
M M M F F M M
ES SE S S S p E
w w w
E ES E p p wE S S E
w p w w w p w
 


  

    

     
 
         (A III.6) 
The sign of FM
M




 is the opposite of M
M
dw
dp
. The relationship between FM  and M  is 
more complicated than the relationship between FM  and F  where FM
F




 varied 
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with the sign of F
M
dw
dp
. This is because while  FM
M




 has the opposite sign of M
M
dw
dp
, 
FM  has the same sign as F
M
dw
dp
.  
 Consider for example the case when M FS S  which unambiguously implies 
0FM
M





. This is the case where as pM increases both the aggregate and the relative 
market effects work in the direction of decreasing wM (i.e. we unambiguously 
have 0M
M
dw
dp
 .)  Algebraically FM  increases as M  increases. But in this case, the F 
wage may increase or decrease depending on the size of the aggregate and relative 
market effects. So FM  may be positive if the relative market effect dominates the 
aggregate market effect or negative if the opposite is the case. If FM  is positive, then 
elasticity increases and the increase in F wage is greater. If FM  is negative elasticity 
decreases, and there is a lesser decline in F wages.  
 Similarly MM
M




has the opposite sign of M
M
dw
dp
, and MM
F




 has the opposite 
sign of F
M
dw
dp
. Therefore as G  increases, the own population composition elasticity of 
wages | |GH  decreases, G, H = M, F. The cross elasticities however may either 
increase or decrease as G  increases. 
 
 
 
 
